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because it matched the crucial strategic concerns of heterogeneous constituencies with 
respect to security and state-building. It was the cement holding together the coalitions 
that allowed large-scale urban transformation, and it tamed the opposition of the rich 




This paper evaluates transformative policy innovations with respect to security and 
taxation in the three main Colombia cities: Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. In the first two, 
such policies were associated with huge success including, among other results, a 
radical reduction in homicidal rates, improved taxation, and the distinct strengthening of 
key bureaucracies. Elsewhere we (Gutiérrez et al. 2009) have tagged these 
transformation processes as ‘urban/metropolitan miracles’.1 The term comes from the 
fact that both common citizens and pundits considered these to be extremely unlikely, 
that they were fast, and that they were large-scale. In addition, the ‘miracles’ developed 
in the context of decreasing repression and enhanced political debate and openness. 
Why did they take place? Currently, there are two main conflicting answers. According 
to the first, the miracles are simply an illusion—as miracles used to be—and a 
byproduct of the strengthening of the police. Such a position is generally associated 
with the idea that in these issues the local level is basically irrelevant (Sánchez, 
Espinosa and Rivas 2003; Formisano 2002). According to the second view—the official 
version and its variations—the miracles triggered a cultural revolution, which in turn 
improved the quality of life on all fronts (Peñalosa 2003; Mockus 1994; Acero and 
Baracaldo 2007; also Elster 2007). We propose a third option based on the claim that 
any proper interpretation of the phenomenon has to include politics. The effort to 
depoliticize the understanding of the miracles, whether through econometric tools or 
culturalism (Delgado Uribe 2007), is both conceptually wrong and empirically wanting. 
It cannot explain regional variation well (the fact that the miracles anticipated national 
trends, and that they developed in Bogotá and Medellín, but not in Cali or other smaller 
municipalities), nor the pace of change (the transformation of values and mores is 
typically slow). The same can be said of the culturalist recipe, which was adopted after 
the Bogotá success by several small municipalities but in many cases, to no avail. We 
argue, thus, that the success of Bogotá and Medellín was the result of a set of 
institutional underpinnings basically related to the 1991 constitution; the opening of a 
window of opportunity for new political actors; and, as a result, the formation of a new 
government coalition and ‘governance formula’ (according to the venerable Mosca 
terminology, 1939). The potential positive impacts of these elements, in turn, increased 
probabilistically with the presence of certain key variables and social conditions found 
in big cities.2 Thus, the key explanatory dimension of the miracles is the emergence of a 
new type of politics in a specific (metropolitan) context.3 Political explanations, 
accounting for spatial and longitudinal variance, behave better than other explanations. 
The political explanation, however, begs additional questions, and one of the main 
issues is the dynamics of innovation. How were the new, successful formulas invented 
and adopted? Why did they cement new coalitions? Why did they not trigger a 
                                                 
1 Juan Carlos Florez, a journalist, mayor-candidate, and intellectual brought our attention to the fact that 
the term ‘miracle’ had actually been utilized in public debate when key actors started to realize the 
magnitude of the changes. See El Tiempo (2003a). 
2 For example, municipal autonomy was a blessing for Bogotá, but in small towns it allowed state 
institutions to be overtaken by the paramilitary, the narcos, or the guerrilla. 
3 The argument stresses that the same type of politics in a different context could end in disaster. 2 
successful negative response by the rich, or by well-established political actors? Why 
did they have a (relatively) stable state-strengthening effect?  
To answer these questions, it is necessary to reflect on the nature of ideological and 
policy innovation. It is rather surprising that these ideas have been basically shunned in 
the study of state crises/building, and of policy successes or failures in the developing 
world. Probably the weight of inertia—the habit of considering these to be pure 
epiphenomena, or overdetermined byproducts of social structures—explains the 
vacuum. It is probably true that successful policy (and state-building) innovation takes 
place because of the convergence of ideas and strategic demands. This convergence 
fixes public notions and alliances onto a small set of focal points, and offers cues that 
allow collective actors to orient themselves and operate according to a new, freshly 
introduced, set of verbal formulas, skills, and routines. Let us consider these two factors 
separately. Ideas played a critical role in the miracles described here. The formation of 
new coalitions and governance patterns cannot be understood without ideas, as they are 
fundamental for at least three reasons. First of all, during times of significant change 
they are the only avenue through which actors can express, take hold of, and negotiate 
their interests. In other words, ‘politics is not only a contest for power. It is also a 
struggle for the interpretation of interests’ (Hall 1997: 174). Furthermore, it is a contest 
for the materials that enable actors to make them explicit and give them a publicly 
usable form, i.e., to express them in a specific type of language. Public discourse has the 
particularity that it has to be coined in universal terms, even if it is produced to fulfil 
particular interests (Elster 2007). The translation of a disperse constellation of interests, 
aversions, and fears into compact, articulate and universalistic formulas allows—and 
sometimes triggers—the process of collective action/discovery. Second, ideas give 
origin to policy paradigms (Weir 1992). They offer blueprints and focal points for 
identifying and prioritizing problems (Weir 1992), the toolkit to face them, and the 
yardstick for evaluating and publicly negotiating the outcomes. They not only constrain 
policy choices, but also regulate access to decision-making, as only specific groups of 
individuals and networks have the skills to resolve the problem once the guidelines and 
evaluation criteria have been fixed. Last but not least, ideas allow actors to discover 
actual or potential allies, and interact with them with respect to focal points. Innovation 
in the terrain of ideas is associated with the identification of privileged arenas of conflict 
enunciation/resolution, to expand the horizon of political imagination, and to push new 
agendas forward. 
Ideas can be successfully translated into operational policies only if the ‘stars are 
aligned’—if they are able to match a series of ‘objective’ factors, and overcome the 
constraints that come from technological restrictions and strategic demands made by 
relevant agents, networks, and groups. We show here that the following dynamics took 
place in the major Colombian cities. Due to a deep national (urban) crisis, a demand for 
innovation existed. Thus, all political players were vying to demonstrate their 
innovativeness. This involved a game of signalling. Candidates had to show that they 
were new, and yet at the same time had to be able to win the elections. However, once 
in power, they needed to implement genuinely transformative policies, which depended 
on having not only a broad margin of manoeuvre but also access to specific skills. This 
double set of contradictions—building credibility and coalitions, on the one hand, and 
implementing new policy prototypes but having to coordinate different interests—
defined the ‘space of possibility’ for the urban innovators.  3 
The Colombian metropolises were burdened with high homicide and other crime rates, 
and perceived disorder and anomie. Rulers, in the classic state-building efforts, were 
confronted with the problem of raising money and managing guns. Who could do it? 
Both the political left and the right criticized the old parties for allowing the crisis to 
develop. A self-referred demand prototype arose in the context of the disaggregation of 
the old political system: to show that you are able to conduct different type of politics 
with lower transaction costs. The crafters of the miracles translated this demand into 
policies through discourse that rejected all types of particularism. At first blush, this 
might appear to be standard politics: universalistic dialogue in terms of the nation, the 
people, the city, the community. But the anti-particularistic discourse of the miracles 
had an idiosyncratic twist, claiming to be disentangled from representation. ‘Not to 
represent anybody’, ‘not to be in debt with anybody’, and being able to demonstrate this 
type of purity became the magic formula. All class or group interests outside the 
interests of the whole city should be exposed and castigated. Instead of the classical 
liberal definition of public space as a clash of diverse interests that limit each other 
(Lechner 1986), anti-particularism emphasized change to transcend such confrontation. 
Now, for those aware of the Latin American context in the 1990s and at the beginning 
of the new century, it is clear that this set of ideas has a somewhat obvious ‘family air’ 
with respect to the neoliberal ideological paradigm. Latin American neoliberalism was 
furiously anti-statist (Roberts 1998). We show here how and why, in this specific 
context, the anti-particularist discourse evolved towards a state-building programme. As 
in standard Latin American neoliberalism, decision-making was made in the name of a 
government of the most knowledgeable (the morally superior, the most efficacious 
manager, the ultimate technocrat), while bargaining was shunned. But the degree of 
metropolitan anti-particularism analysed here was accompanied by a strong moral 
message, which emphasized pedagogy from above, re-education, and the build-up of the 
state muscle. Thus, it is clear that there was no ‘pre-established harmony’ between the 
dialogue on anti-traditional politics and pro-state practices. Quite to the contrary, the 
pro-state turn of the metropolitan experiences we discuss here is rather an outlier.  
We analyse how the innovations worked and how they were translated into 
state-building policies in Bogotá and Medellín, but fell short of inducing significant 
change in Cali. This underscores the role of path dependency and contingency. The first 
section of the paper is dedicated to signalling: how did the winning candidates show that 
they were different. The second section examines the interaction between ideas and 
interests in the context of governance problems, while the third section focuses on 
taxation. In each section, we show how ideas interacted with interests and restrictions, 
and how this interaction produced specific policy outcomes. Frequently, but not always, 
we use examples taken from all three cities, and illustrate the (ideological and strategic) 
conditions that brought about success or failure. 
Our conclusions are somewhat apprehensive. The very condition that allowed the 
existence of the miracles—the notion of a rebellion by all society against old political 
practices—may block their sustainability. If this is the case, then we may be facing a 
‘high equilibrium trap’. 4 
2 Context 
2.1 Signalling 
In 1991, the mainstream Colombian newspaper El Tiempo published the following 
despondent picture of Bogotá: ‘The city is the incoherent sum of thousands of interests 
that have nothing in common. The proud towers of the emergent bourgeoisie coexist 
with enormous gulfs of misery, where the poisonous fungi of desperation are being 
cultivated. There is no communication or mutual understanding between both worlds’ 
(El Tiempo 1994a). 
The observation was widely shared by opinion makers. The city was affected by a 
narcotics war, high levels of violence, and a very tight budgetary situation. This crisis, 
together with the 1991 constitution, triggered major political change. The old bipartisan 
system predominant in Colombia unravelled in Bogotá between 1992 and 1994.4 While 
it was taken for granted in 1992 that the LP candidate would be the mayor, in the 1994 
elections the situation was the following. The LP put forth Enrique Peñalosa, who, by 
then, was considered as a young promising politician, but a lightweight, and none of the 
consolidated leaders wanted to risk a spectacular defeat. But sectors of the public and 
the media (but also of NGOs and social movements) supported the aspirations of an 
outsider, Antanas Mockus. All of them saw him as someone able to defy the entrenched 
political preferences. Some electronic media leaders were enthused by Mockus’s outré 
gesture while he was still rector of the National University.5 His campaign emphasized 
its ‘young’, ‘technical’, and ‘non-political’ character (El Tiempo 1994b). It was designed 
to be low cost, to rely heavily on the media, and turn around the iconic messages and 
‘pedagogic games’, which converged towards the central aspiration: ‘everybody puts, 
everybody wins’.  
The fact that the candidate was a philosopher and mathematician, who spoke and 
‘looked’ different, motive the voters. In particular, there was a bandwagon effect among 
the rich and the middle classes towards Mockus, who initially was not their candidate, 
and had no organic links with them (see, for example, the declarations of the Chamber 
of Commerce, El Tiempo 1994c). This effect is evidenced, first, by the declarations of 
the private sector association leaders and key middle- and high-class opinion makers 
(e.g., the Corona Foundation, El Tiempo 1994d). Second, it was evident in the 
individual behaviour of the voters. As shown in Gutiérrez (1995), the social sectors with 
the strongest pro-traditional party affiliations were concentrated among the city’s high 
economic strata. During Mockus’s election, however, these were not the ones who 
voted for him, but rather they were among the individuals who most rapidly changed 
opinion in his favour. Eventually, the result was a concentration of the traditional vote 
in the popular sectors. And third, the bandwagon effect was seen in the behaviour of the 
traditional voters themselves. Obviously, not all or not even the majority of these 
belonged to the socioeconomic elites. However, the voters were influenced by them, 
                                                 
4 As happened in Colombia ten years later. See Gutiérrez (2007). 
5 He showed his buttocks to an assembly of students who were booing him. 5 
and at the same time sent the candidates a strong signal with respect to their preferences. 
The outstanding fact in this environment is that a substantial part of this sector sided 
with Mockus without relinquishing their self-affiliation. For example, according to an 
opinion poll, Mockus had a plurality (58 per cent support) even among those who 
identified themselves as liberals.6 Voters considering themselves liberals or 
conservatives probably supported their banner at the national level, but at the municipal 
level they placed their bet on the individual able to signal his ‘otherness’. 
Mockus’ triumph consolidated a trend that all politicians were very much aware of. 
Bogotá had mainly been a liberal city. Indeed, the city had tended to give premium to 
dissidents and non-mainstream figures within the traditional parties. However, only 
once after 1994 did a (national) candidate affiliated to one of these parties come first. A 
wide sector of public opinion voted against the traditional options.7 This forced the 
candidates to adapt. They understood that they had to demonstrate their ‘independence’ 
to the voters. The most spectacular case is that of Enrique Peñalosa, who reinvented 
himself in 1997. Once a young liberal Turk, he transformed himself into an 
independent, cajoling for the ‘anti-political vote’, against strong opposition. He changed 
his manner of addressing the public, by personally distributing, for example, his 
propaganda in the streets, and by stressing the ‘civic’, ‘non partisan’ nature of his 
campaign. Having failed as a ‘traditional politician’, Peñalosa won in 1998 as an 
‘independent’. It soon became evident that the support of one of the old parties was the 
kiss of death for any serious aspirant. The next elections were captured by Mockus by a 
landslide. But then the newly-created Left Party (Polo Democrático Independiente and 
Polo Democrático Alternativo, PDI/PDA) won twice in a row. In the first victory, the 
candidate was once again able to appear as ‘different’, a fact considerably publicized. 
Although we are not aware of any systematic study of the issue, evidence from the 
opinion polls suggests that the voters of PDI/PDA were the same who had voted for the 
miracle in the past, and certainly not the radicalized popular sectors (Gutiérrez 2007), 
although these started to play a role after the Polo governments consolidated.8 The 
media lent its support to the political left against the traditional politicians, but not 
against Peñalosa and his friends. It claimed that the mandate of the left in power would 
be to maintain and develop the miracle, perhaps humanize it, but not to yield to 
demagogic pressures (El Tiempo 2007a). It also declared it would meticulously follow 
up its performance, which indeed it did. 
Initial conditions in Medellín were much less favourable. As a Catholic and 
conservative stronghold, the city did not have Bogotá’s penchant for dissidence. 
Furthermore, the traditional politicians of Medellín themselves were cunning 
innovators. On the one hand, they were intent on maintaining and feeding their 
networks and their skills and assets intimately associated with the old way of doing 
things, but on the other hand, they tried to overcome the wear and tear of their political 
trademarks. The solution was to present one’s platform in the elections in the name of 
different ‘civic’, one-shot, undertakings. Many of these aspired to speak in the name of 
                                                 
6 The political identity most opposed to his campaign (El Tiempo 1994e). 
7 At the municipal council, the dynamics was somewhat different, but eventually tended to converge. See 
Guzmán (2008). 
8 Juan Carlos Flórez, Enrique Borda, personal communication. Flórez was mayor candidate in 1997 and 
municipal councillor in the 2007 period; Borda was general secretary of the district (2006) during the first 
PDA administration. 6 
the bourgeoisie, emphasizing the fact that they represented the ‘managers’ more than 
the politicians. Luis Pérez, a liberal, went a step further. He portrayed himself as the 
ultimate manager (El Tiempo 1997a), but supplemented this with a design for an anti-
corruption programme with concrete objectives, and a denunciation of the corruptive 
capacity of the private sector. Here we have the anti-particularist discourse in quite an 
advanced form. However, he was not able to implement the policies associated with the 
miracle, because he himself was a slave of the audiences and networks that took him to 
power (El Tiempo 2004a).  
In the 2004 election, the innovator was Sergio Fajardo, a university mathematician, 
supported by NGOs, who soon showed that he excelled in managing the language of 
television. Fajardo’s catchword was trust. In the name of trust he was able to organize a 
rebellion against the traditional political practices. Indeed, contrary to Bogotá, the 
rebellion was not conveyed as ‘something different’ from politics, but rather as an 
alternative form of politics (El Tiempo 2003b). However, the core content—that decent 
people had to come together and appropriate public life for themselves—was identical. 
This was the reason for his success. When his successor, Alonso Salazar, a journalist 
and researcher, was challenged, he was defended (by intellectuals and public figures, El 
Tiempo 2007b) as preventing a return of the old way of doing things. 
In Cali, the old way never disappeared; instead it became mixed and mingled with the 
new, producing a hybrid. Indeed, the main ideas that gave birth to the miracles were 
hatched in Cali. The city was also accustomed to new political practices. Contrary to 
Bogotá where voters supported traditional dissidents, and Medellín where they bet on 
the traditional die-hards, Cali had flirted with independents as early as 1980 (Vazquez 
2001). However, the innovators were not able to link their ideas to an efficient method 
of public signalling: they sent forth new proposals from the old networks. For example, 
Rodrigo Guerrero, who had produced the core ideology instrumental to the miracles, 
was elected by conservatives, thus his administration had to include representatives of 
different factions (El Tiempo 1992a). Not only did this have a powerful symbolic effect 
for the public, but it also empowered different claimants to defend their specific 
interests from within whenever the need arose. So, it was not a case of Cali lacking 
innovation in the same degree as Bogotá and Medellín; in actual fact, it was a greater 
innovation hotbed than either city. Innovators came from the old parties, but they were 
not easy to differentiate from other agents in the political realm because everybody was 
hybridizing. As will be seen with respect to all the critical policy issues, the 
hybridization of the Cali innovators diminished not only the signals, but also 
governance, allowing interest groups to neutralize proposed solutions. 
2.2 Synthesizing 
The breakdown of the old party system in Bogotá, which anticipated what was 
happening at the national level, opened the window of opportunity for innovators, but at 
the same time forced them to generate a signalling system ex novo. Instead of the 
‘normal’ bipartisan politics—when party A, known to all voters, governs, and party B 
criticizes and issues alternative proposals—candidates had to show voters that they were 
of the ‘correct’ type. Voters wanted to support ‘independents’ who would be able to 
overcome the old way of doing things, but had deficient information and training to do 
so. This forced candidates to publicly highlight their departure from the traditional 
parties, and to exhibit their separation from traditional networks. In Medellín, traditional 7 
politicians copied the independents, creating ‘civic’ brands, etc., but eventually were 
out-signalled by a genuine independent, who could exhibit irrefutable non-traditional 
credentials. In Cali, the innovators came from the old political personnel, gained power 
based on the support from these networks, and thus voters lacked clear criteria to make 
a distinction between the different types of politicians. 
3  Governing the commons: the ideas and the resources 
How were the forgers of the miracles able to criticize politicians and society, increase 
taxation, and promote social discipline? Indeed, they faced staunch opposition. In 
Bogotá, the first years of the Mockus and Peñalosa administrations were quite turbulent, 
and their level of support low (Gaitan and Parra 2008).9 Neither had a strong 
representation in the municipal council that tried to block several of their initiatives. 
They were attacked by the political parties, but they had the clout to uphold their main 
policies, and later to exhibit results. 
There are a number of key factors that might help to answer the question posed above. 
We must start with the wave of reforms associated with the 1991 constitution. Greater 
autonomy, more attributions in security decision-making, popular elections of mayors, 
reform of the municipal councils (paying councillors, but excluding them from the 
management of public utilities) are, among others, the institutional preconditions of the 
miracles. Inconsistencies of the constitution also introduced the opportunity for new 
patterns of governance. However, these opportunities were not activated in all context; 
the new politics in many Colombian municipalities was not related with pro-state 
coalitions, but with the capture of the state by private agents (Gutiérrez 2007).  
So what made the difference? First, the nature of the signalling game. Candidates, by 
exhibiting their ‘otherness’, could respond to the demands of several classes of voters. 
They could do so because they counted on the resources provided by: the media, and 
especially national television, universities, access to ‘modern’ discourse. But these 
resources could be utilized only in a political dynamics where hybridization did not 
smother new voices. In other words, in Bogotá and Medellín the level of noise was 
sufficiently small so that big chunks of voters could differentiate between genuine 
innovators and other agents. The crisis of the city allowed innovators to speak against 
poor politics in the name of society. Governing was not about distributive issues, but 
about solving collective action problems: the system could be taken closer to the 
frontier of optimality, for the benefit of all. City actors had to be re-educated to be able 
to cooperate. Since this vision was supported and promoted by both journalistic 
common-sense about identity and civicness, and by social-scientific categories that were 
by then en vogue, the new discourse also attracted scores of intellectuals and 
technocrats. The bourgeoisie could also adhere to this blueprint, because it guaranteed 
stability of property rights, reduced corruption as well as the toll extracted by the old 
type of politics, and resolved its own collective action dilemmas. The tradeoff of the 
delegation of decision-making and increased contribution to public goods versus lower 
transaction costs, better infrastructure and increased predictability, appeared attractive, 
                                                 
9  Medellín’s case is somewhat different, but the actors had learnt from the experiences of others. 8 
but could be implemented only by those who were ostensibly able to show that they 
would not free ride. 
The tradeoff separated the rich from immediate decision-making (to which they had had 
multiple channels of access via lobbying), but at the same time incorporated them much 
more strongly into the governing coalition. In the old scheme, the specific interests of 
different sectors of entrepreneurs were dealt with by political intermediaries. This 
created huge collective action and congestion problems. For example, public transport 
was in the hands of entrepreneurs who, thanks to their active presence in the political 
system, could maintain rules that were individually favourable to each of them but 
collectively a disaster (both for the city and for general standards of predictability, 
efficiency and productivity). By-passing them in the decision-making process generated 
loud protests, and indeed might have triggered the formation of an anti-governmental 
coalition of all the rich. In reality, what happened was that there was an almost 
unanimous reaction against particularist demands by those who had voice (El Tiempo 
2007c). The key observation is that each sector can tolerate being stripped from its 
particularistic perks if it believes that others suffer a similar fate. In other words, 
signalling was crucial not only for winning elections, but also for implementing 
innovations. Castro tried to promote collective action, and gave the citizenship all kinds 
of guarantees that the resources would not disappear in the deep pockets of politicians, 
but he was not believed.  
Of course, this was possible only in the context in which signalling also played another 
role: indicating that property rights would be strictly respected. The managerial turn, 
and the choice of economic teams,10 for example, fulfilled this function. Market 
economy and productivity were buzz words in the new discourse (El Tiempo 2007d). 
But, once again, this was not enough. In a context where neoliberalism—nationally and 
internationally—was the main reference point, the managerial turn could only articulate 
itself to a pro-state politics because of the special ‘alignment of the stars’. Which one? 
Civicness, non-particularism, anti-violence, promotion of social capital, even 
managerialism, were subjected to strong criticism by the ‘really existing’ society. They 
could be preached, and proposed as governance objectives, only on the basis of a very 
strong pedagogical programme. Individual candidates, not linked with any party or 
major structure, could put forward a credible pedagogic platform utilizing only the 
muscle of the state and the media. The other side of the coin is that their strategic 
limitations and deficiencies also forced them onto a pro-state path. They did not have 
access to the long clientelistic networks of traditional politics. Nor did they have any 
relevant governance experience or an already-existing constituency (not even Peñalosa, 
who was the best prepared candidate with respect to urban themes, and at the same time, 
was the closest to traditional politics). All lacked structures of communication with the 
public and with significant audiences. Their only asset was the small group of 
intellectuals and technocrats, recruited from public universities and from NGOs, who 
became key decision makers in their governments (El Tiempo 2007e). All of this created 
a strategic interest in promoting the state’s regulatory muscle and the articulation of 
public policies in the media. 
                                                 
10 Also in the governments of the left (El Tiempo 1997b). 9 
4  Taxation without representation 
Municipal governments were entitled to play a bigger tributary role after early reforms 
(Ley 14 de 1983) were consolidated by the 1991 constitution process. The main taxes 
administrated at the municipal level include: industry and commerce, real estate and 
valorization, and gasoline. Municipalities also collect public utility payments. Several 
evaluations by the national department of planning have shown that the fiscal trajectory 
of the municipalities in the 1990s has become quite differentiated (DNP 2005).  
In both Bogotá and Medellín, tributary issues played a major role in public debates—
until the anti-particularist agenda finally came through (at least partially). The Cali 
trajectory is more tortuous. The second elected mayor, Germán Villegas (conservative), 
proposed an increase in real estate tax, but only for certain sectors of the city, which 
happened to be the poorest ones. Such blatant unfairness generated an angry rejection, 
even from the municipal councillors of his own party (El Tiempo 1991). His successor, 
Rodrigo Guerrero, tried to stratify and increase the key taxes (including real estate) but 
faced resistance from several politically-allied entrepreneurs. The municipal council 
announced a tax amnesty that cost the city 37 000 million pesos (El Tiempo 1995), and 
promoted an exemptions scheme to those industrialists who invested in the city. There 
was a steep increase in water and energy tariffs, but without consideration for 
stratification (which once again naturally punished the poor). According to the board of 
city’s public utilities enterprise (EMCALI), ‘it was convenient not to punish the high 
and high middle classes more than the rest of the population, and decided to set a 
similar (proportionally) increase in the tariff’, as the EMCALI manager explained (El 
Tiempo 1996). Guerrero’s successor, Guzmán, had a falling-out with the private sector, 
which considered that his tax increase proposal too high, and Guzmán threatened to 
publish a list of the rich who opposed the payment of taxes (El Tiempo 1997c). The 
regional president of the industrialists’ association protested against the alleged ‘wave 
of taxation’ that weakened businesses. He argued that instead of taking money away 
from the entrepreneurs, governmental agencies need to become more efficient. There is 
evidence that, in Cali at least, the anti-tax stance of the private sector had broad citizen 
support.11 In 1997, Guzmán had to yield, just before being suddenly jailed for 
complicity with narcotics trafficking.12 The acting mayor, Martínez, finally froze the 
real estate tax, a measure that was frowned upon by the national government, as by then 
it was seriously concerned with the budgetary situation of the city.13 In subsequent 
negotiations, the city lost its margin of manoeuvre. Cali committed itself to report its 
financial results periodically to the national government, providing details on the 
amount of taxes captured and the number of its doubtful debtors. The government 
promised to finance a part of Cali’s proposed mass transport system—inspired by the 
Bogotá plan implemented by Peñalosa—if the city were able to show prudent fiscal 
behaviour. The city’s industrialists criticized the agreement, as they felt that it lacked 
community participation (El Tiempo 1998). 
                                                 
11 According to a poll, 79.25 per cent of the interviewed were against a gasoline tax increase in the 
gasoline tax while only 15.25 per cent supported it (El Tiempo 1992b). 
12 He was already facing other corruption scandals (El Tiempo 1997d). 
13 In its performance goals for Cali, the national government set high fiscal objectives for the city. See El 
Tiempo (1997e).  10 
Candidates in the 1997 campaign tried to attract voters—and contributors—with the 
promise of a tax freeze. Later, the municipal council decided to revise the entire 
collection system for real estate taxes. Several (downwards) tax readjustments also took 
place, and the city ultimately fell into a brutal fiscal crash. It had to sign a new 
agreement with the government, but on much worse terms, which caused the 
elimination of several agencies and massive redundancies (El Tiempo 2001a). EMCALI 
was declared unviable and barely saved. Finally, when property had increased in value 
thanks to works by the municipality, the municipal council decided to establish a tax 
(predial) on land tenure. The next mayor implemented an austerity plan, a fact that did 
not improve his relations with the city’s bourgeoisie (El Tiempo 2001b). Finally, 
Apolinar Salcedo increased taxation, but also decided to privatize collection, claiming 
this made as part of a ‘modernizing’ plan. The outsourcing of the collection of taxes 
generated continuous scandals, one of which ended in Salcedo’s impeachment (8 May 
2007). He was replaced by Ramiro Díaz Tafur, who until then had been the president of 
the Society of Agriculturalists and Cattle Ranchers of el Valle. 
In the Colombian context, Medellín had an excellent record of tax collection right from 
the start (Lopez Gonzalez and Mesa Callejas 2008). It was also known for the efficiency 
of its public utilities firm (Empresas Públicas de Medellín, EMP). EMP plays a major 
role in the city’s bureaucratic culture, as it has a much bigger budget than the 
municipality, and is the icon of public managerial capacity. However, towards the end 
of the Luis Pérez administration, EPM was affected by a major corruption scandal (El 
Tiempo 2003c), one of the facts that probably affected the support offered by the rich to 
Fajardo. Furthermore, the city was deeply in debt because of the construction of its 
subway (in the 1980s).14 Much in the spirit of Centeno’s classic book (2002), regional 
congressmen asserted that the two main problems of the city were violence and debt. In 
addition, the nation refused additional resources for the city until its debt was tamed (El 
Tiempo 2003d). 
Fajardo planned to declare a fiscal dictatorship, but signalled powerfully at the same 
time how the money would be used. He changed the EPM board, selecting the members 
based on meritocracy (El Tiempo 2003e). The municipal council extended to him the 
special powers that he had requested for this purpose. Using these powers, Fajardo put a 
part of EPM (its telecommunication activities) up for sale.15 This triggered a huge 
national debate (El Tiempo 2005a) but was finally approved (El Tiempo 2005b). 
Another controversial step by the Fajardo administration was his steep increase of the 
real state tax for future housing projects in El Poblado, the iconic neighbourhood of the 
rich. Though the scheme received national support, it was watered down by the 
municipal council to accommodate criticism from the private sector (El Tiempo 2004b). 
In Bogotá, Jaime Castro had tried to modify the city’s tributary structure, and to 
increase both the gasoline and real estate taxes to fund a mega plan of public works (El 
Tiempo 1992c). The gasoline proposal was shunned, but the land scheme survived a bit 
longer. The proposals were rebuked by public opinion, entrepreneurs, the political left, 
and members of Castro’s own party (Castro 2001). Despite the fact that both technocrats 
and the presidency recognized the essentially correct character of the new tributary 
package, only very few joined the fray to support him (Castro 2001). Several 
                                                 
14 It was riddled with corruption and inefficiency. 
15 The holders were other public-municipal agencies. 11 
exemptions were included during negotiations with the municipal council, but 
adversaries used the theme to combat and weaken Castro. The fiscal enthusiasm of the 
mayor was one of the main sources of his enormous discredit (El Tiempo 1993a). He 
wrote an open letter to the public, imploring them to approve the reforms and offered a 
guarantee that there was not, and would not be, a ‘tributary cascade’ El Tiempo (1993b). 
He added, ‘This fiscal sacrifice will be a demonstration of love for the city’. To ensure 
that the new resources would not be stolen, he asked the Commerce Chamber to strictly 
supervise their management.16 The tributary offensive almost cost Castro his post, and 
was finally archived. 
The only public figure to openly support Castro’s proposals was Mockus, by then 
during his campaign. He openly advocated more taxes for everyone, and yet, he won. 
This, as noted by partisans, adversaries, and observers, is quite uncommon. As mayor, 
he revived the gasoline tax, and later pushed forward an ‘integral’ tax reform. 
Presenting the bill to the municipal council, he demanded that not one iota be changed. 
He was accused by councillors of all political shades—and not unreasonably, at that—
of arm twisting, and of trying to collect more resources than he actually needed. But he 
was eventually able to implement his package. His second administration was even 
more pro-taxes (El Tiempo 2002), as it launched a culturalist campaign that tried to 
persuade people to pay more taxes than their obligatory share. What is surprising about 
this ‘initiative of voluntary taxation’ is that it garnered more than marginal support. In 
the 2003 fiscal year, the city captured 110 per cent of the tributes to which it was legally 
entitled. Peñalosa continued this trend, increasing gasoline tax and pushing forward an 
anti-evasion plan. As Fajardo did later, he continually asserted that he was visibly 
transforming the city, and citizens could directly see where their taxes were going. 
These forms of monitoring were energetically praised and promoted by the media. 
Ironically, fiscal passion cooled down somewhat when the left gained power. Despite a 
very ambitious social programme, Garzón pledged a freeze on taxes, but the citizens 
apparently did not believe him. An opinion poll concluded that ‘what the Bogotanos do 
not believe [of Garzón’s campaign] is his promise of not exacting new taxes …’ When 
asked if they thought that Garzón would fulfil his promise of not increasing tributes, 
19.3 per cent said that they did, and 74.3 per cent said that they did not. Later, the 
elected mayor recognized that in some areas this promise [of not raising taxes] was not 
possible (El Tiempo 2004c). Later, Garzón backed away from the proposal to adjust real 
state tax (Guzmán 2008).  
5 Conclusions 
Anti-particularism was a language related to political demands—linked organically with 
the pro-1991 constitution movement—which became effective because it matched the 
crucial strategic concerns of heterogeneous constituencies with respect to security and 
state-building. It was the cement holding together the coalitions that allowed large-scale 
urban transformation, and it tamed the opposition of the rich because it was issued as 
the solution their (and everyone else’s) collective action problems. It neutralized the 
                                                 
16 Actually, as the mayor observed, he was not creating new taxes, but demanding the effective collection 
of already existing ones. 12 
traditional parties, and was able to offer public goods and services, such as improved 
security, that past governance formulas had been unable to deliver. It was also a good 
signalling resource: in Bogotá and Medellín it made it possible for voters and key 
audiences to (somewhat) recognize the authentic, genuine innovators from the hybrids 
and imitators. On the other hand, it eluded other critical governance dimensions, like re-
distribution, conflict, spillovers, and externalities. For example, the PNUD evaluation of 
the Bogotá tributary trajectory reveals that taxation improved substantially, but that it 
remained flat: the ‘commons’ resources increased, but inequality did not shrink. 
Medellín’s security solution remains under suspicion, due to its gradualism with respect 
to organized crime. 
All in all, though, citizens and analysts concur in highlighting that both cities underwent 
a major transformation in the course of a few years. We have suggested here that policy 
innovation has indeed institutional and material pre-requisites, but it cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the crucial role of ideas and the way—and 
conditions—in which they become a social force. 
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